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MR. M. SHAPIRO: Good morning, all. My name is Michael Shapiro. I work at
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, where I primarily specialize in international
copyright issues. It’s an absolute pleasure to serve as moderator for this panel on
international copyright.
Let me begin by introducing our distinguished speakers and panelists: Joel Smith
from Herbert Smith Freehills LLP in London; Jerker Rydén, Senior Legal Advisor,
National Library of Sweden in Stockholm; Mihály Ficsor, President of the Hungarian
Copyright Council in Budapest and former Assistant Director-General at WIPO; The
Honorable Yoshiaki Shibata from the Tokyo District Court, 46th Division; Silke von
Lewinski, with the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich; my
namesake, Ted Shapiro from Wiggin LLP, London; and Marcus von Welser from Vossius
& Partner in Germany.
As you can see, we have a very distinguished panel and a very rich menu of topics.
The initial title for this session was “International Copyright Potpourri.” I see
somewhere along the line Hugh changed the title of the panel. You’ll be able to make the
decision by the end of the panel whether it is in fact a “potpourri” of miscellaneous topics
or whether perhaps we can find a coherent thread to bring these disparate topics all under
the umbrella of international copyright.
I would now like to turn the floor over to Mihály Ficsor, who is going to give us a
brief seven-minute presentation on the topic of “online exhaustion,” particularly with
reference to the rights of making available to the public and reproduction in the European
Union.
MR. FICSOR: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
When I registered for the Conference, I uploaded to the Conference website a
forty-five-page-long paper under the same title as this.1 My presentation contains twenty
slides, but, because the time is very short, actually I have to proceed now to the conclusion.
[Laughter]
I’m going to show only two slides, the very first one and the last substantive one.
The very first one in a way sums up what I presented in forty-five pages and here
in twenty pages, and what otherwise the Association Littéraire Artistique Internationale
(ALAI), the oldest and still very active NGO in the field of authors’ rights, presented in an
opinion which is available on ALAI’s website (www.alai.org) about the Tom Kabinet case.2
I’m going to show the rest possibly at the speed that you can see advertisements at the side
of the highway when you drive a car at the speed of 140 km/hr.
1

See Dr. Mihály J. Ficsor, Tom Kabinet: there is no "online exhaustion" of the right of
making available to the public even if it is characterized as distribution (as there is no real "elending" either), COPYRIGHT SEESAW (Aug. 20, 2018), http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/en/papers.
2
Case C-263/18, Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Grp. Algemene Uitgevers v. Tom
Kabinet Internet, BVECLI:EU:C:2019:1111 (Dec. 19, 2019).
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In Tom Kabinet, which is a case in front of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, a Dutch court asked not less than whether or not when a used e-book is uploaded
to the website Tom Kabinet, which is actually an online virtual second-hand bookshop, and
then from there it is made available to the public and somebody downloads it, all this is
covered by the principle of exhaustion.
I refer to the ALAI opinion I have just mentioned, the preparation of which I also
participated in and Silke von Lewinski, sitting in front of me, also very much participated
too. The answer to the Tom Kabinet court’s question by ALAI, rightly enough, was: no,
there is no exhaustion, because in such a case what takes place are at least three things:
when an e-book is uploaded to the website, it is a reproduction; it merges into the makingavailable-to-public right; and when it is downloaded it is a reproduction again; and none of
these rights are covered by the principle of exhaustion.
The ALAI opinion also dealt with the argument of those who are in favor of online
exhaustion; namely, that there is equivalence between the online making available of works
when they are downloaded in a permanent way and distribution of copies.
Yes, there is equivalence. This equivalence was fully taken into account when we
adopted the two WIPO Treaties in 1996, and the answer was: no matter whether you can
characterize this as distribution or communication to the public, the streaming or
downloading is covered by the exclusive right of making available to the public.
If you characterize this as distribution and you add that, because you characterize
that as distribution, you also apply exhaustion, you are in conflict with the international
treaties and also with the acquis communautaire3 because, both in an Agreed Statement to
Article 6 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)4 and in Article 3(3)5 of the EU Information
Society Directive, it is clarified that only tangible copies are covered by the right of
distribution and, therefore, they are exhausted only with their first sale.
The second argument of the supporters of online exhaustion was: okay, the right
of distribution only applies for tangible copies; but if you also extend the right to intangible
copies, you increase the level of protection. Yes, you may. But if you add that the right
characterized in this way exhausts too, you go down brutally under the level of protection
which is required.
The opinion of ALAI didn’t deal in substance with the Court of Justice judgments
in UsedSoft6 and VOB).7 There is a dangerous opinion that we shouldn’t care about
UsedSoft and VOB because UsedSoft only applies to software online exhaustion and VOB
only for e-lending of books and they do not apply to e-rental and so on. In my paper, I
analyze the reasons for which those two judgments are in an unfriendly relationship with
the relevant international and EU norms and why the Allposters8 judgment of the Court of
Justice and the ReDigi judgment of the Second Circuit9 have gone in the right direction.
3

This refers to the accumulated body of European Union law and obligations from 1958
to the present day.
4
See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
5
Directive 2001/29/EC. Article 3 of the EU Information Society Directive states that
“The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of communication
to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article.”
6
Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int'l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000.
7
Case C-174/15, Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v. Stichting Leenrecht,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:856 (Nov. 10, 2016).
8
Case C-419/13, Art & Allposters Int’l BV v. Stichting Pictoright, ECLI:EU:C.2015:27
(Jan. 22, 2015).
9
Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Nevertheless, in my paper I point out that, unfortunately, it is understandable that
the Tom Kabinet Court has been of the view that, if the arguments in the UsedSoft and VOB
decisions of the Court of Justice might work, then they might work also in this case too.
My proposal is that we should apply another solution. The legal-political
objectives that the Court of Justice wanted to achieve in UsedSoft and VOB may be
achieved also in accordance with the existing international norms and the acquis
communautaire. The objective may be achieved also through possible exceptions to the
rights of reproduction and interactive making available to the public on the basis of the
three-step test provided in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 10 of the
WCT.10
The schema above is intended to show what kinds of criteria should be taken into
account for the application of the three-step test in order to establish whether or not we
may speak about a special case and whether or not there is a conflict with a normal
exploitation of the works and/or unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the
rightsholders.
This is a schema; it is not a mathematical equation, but it shows the different
criteria which should be taken into account when considering possible exceptions to the
rights of reproduction and making available to the public. There are many, many criteria.
(q) means quality. Of course, a basic argument for why the exhaustion principle
should not be applied for online exhaustion is that the quality of the copies is perfect; it
doesn’t degrade with the subsequent transmissions.
But the second key element is the three criteria — (s), (e) and (c) — in parentheses
above the line, which were taken actually from the excellent paper published by the United
States Copyright Office on the implementation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act11.
These criteria are the highly increased speed (s) of subsequent transfers of property of
perfect copies, the ease (e) with which this may take place; you do not have to go to a
second-hand bookshop with your copy, and the reduced cost (c) which is nearly zero, since
it just consists of clicking on your keyboard to upload your copy to be transferred. It’s not
like when you go to a second-hand bookshop to sell your copy of the book, and somebody
comes a couple of weeks later and buys it. No; it may be read immediately. In my view,
these are the decisive criteria which may serve as a key argument against widespread
unconditional exceptions even if we presume — without well-founded reasons — that no
retention copy is withheld when the original copy is uploaded in a system like UsedSoft or
Tom Kabinet.
The criteria under the line are also important from the viewpoint of applicability
of exceptions — the genre (g), the function (f), and the purpose (p) of the copies
transmitted. The genre (g) of the works is quite relevant. For example, the impact is specific
in the case of software. It is like a tool. If you really delete the original copy — but there
is a big, big question about that — and a member of the public downloads a copy of the
program made available on the system’s servers, he or she will start using that tool, and the
original owner of the copy simply cannot use it anymore. But an audiovisual work or an ebook is different: their use is consumptive. You can read an excellent thriller in one day,
you just push a button, it goes up, and somebody else may read it immediately. The impact
on the exploitation of works and rights is fundamentally different.
And, of course, the function (f) and purpose (p) of the use are also to be taken into
account. So-called “e-lending” of books, for example, for educational or research purposes
on the basis of an exception to the rights of reproduction and making available to the public
10
11

Article 10 concerns “Limitations and Exceptions.”
U.S. COPY. OFF., DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, at xi. (2001).
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may be justified, but for other kinds of e-publications, such as fiction books, it may not,
because it could undermine the market for those works.
Last, on the other side of the schema, there is circumvention (c) of the system by
retaining a copy in an external memory. It is doubtful that, when the entire process begins,
there is no retention copy, as it has been emphasized by the appeals court in ReDigi.
However, as I stressed, even if there were perfect guarantees against retention copies, it
would not be decisive alone. The other factors indicated in the schema — in particular the
“s + e + c” triptych — would exclude the applicability of a sweeping exception going
beyond what the three factors mentioned under the line – g + f + p – might justify.
Thank you very much.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thank you very much, Mihály. I think you’ve given us a great
deal to think about.
We’ve got five minutes for discussion on this topic that includes speakers,
panelists, and members of the audience. Let me just canvass our panelists.
Silke, you’ve got an observation?
MS. VON LEWINSKI: Yes. Thank you very much.
It is no surprise that in substance I fully agree with what Mihály has said, all the
more since also the German courts, even after the UsedSoft decision, have consistently
held, in respect of audio books that had been offered online for download, that it was clear
that this was an act of making available the audio books to the public and that the
distribution right with its exhaustion would not apply.
They made a proper analysis de lege artis12 — according to the art of statutory
interpretation — and, based on the fundamental distinction in the law between acts of
exploitation in non-tangible and in tangible form, came to the clear and unequivocal
conclusion: yes, of course, it is the making available right which applies to the (nontangible) online offer and transmission of works and this right is not subject to exhaustion.
So, there was even no need to submit a question (on the application of the distribution right
and its exhaustion) to the Court of Justice. But we have this question now from the
Netherlands before the Court of Justice, unfortunately. Maybe one should have avoided
referring the question, which should — if the law is properly interpreted — not be a
question at all.
Well, nobody has a crystal ball as regards the Court of Justice, but at least I would
like to mention one statement of the Court itself in the “e-lending” case, VOB v. Stichting
Leenrecht, where it referred to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) in respect of the rental
right. It acknowledged that the Agreed Statement to the article on rental rights clearly sets
out that rental as well as distribution only refers to copies, and copies by definition are
tangible objects, so there would not be any exhaustion.
That is, the Court recognized this Agreed Statement and its outcome for the rental
right, so maybe it would also recognize it for the distribution right, to which the same
Agreed Statement applies, although the Court would then have to admit that it had made a
mistake in the UsedSoft case.
I don’t want to take too much time so I leave it at that.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks so much for that, Silke. I think that adds quite a bit.
Ted?
MR. T. SHAPIRO: Picking up on that and what the Court of Justice might do in
this case, I am pessimistic. I was at the hearing. I can see two other people in the room who
were also at the hearing, and maybe they are less pessimistic than I am.
12

Latin phrase meaning “skillfully according to the laws.”
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But there is language in the UsedSoft case where the Court talks about how sale
converts a making available into distribution. The Dutch court did not even find that
making available was relevant, but the Court of Justice posed a question to the parties about
this, and they referred to “sale” and they referred to “on a permanent basis,” which made
me think that they were considering this language from UsedSoft.
At the hearing they were asking a lot of questions around that, and they were asking
a lot of questions about deletion — does this work and could Tom Kabinet do it? — and it
was really ridiculous.
So I am a little bit pessimistic because of that, that we could find ourselves in a
place where the subscription models and online “rental” models are not subject to
exhaustion but anything that is “sell-through” is, and then people will have to make
business decisions about how they deal with that.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks for that, Ted. Since you noted the importance of
“deletion” technologies in the Tom Kabinet case, I thought I would mention the 2001
Copyright Office DMCA Section 104 Report, which considered the first-sale doctrine in
the digital age, noted that “forward-and-delete” technology, which could be used to support
a digital first-sale doctrine, was not then available in the marketplace and probably in any
case would not be a “silver bullet.”
Eighteen years later in the United States, I think it is fair to say that we are still
wrestling with many of the issues discussed in the 2001 Section 104 report. In the closely
watched Capitol Records v. ReDigi case, which might be considered more or less the Tom
Kabinet case of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court may weigh in on those issues if
it accepts ReDigi’s cert. petition, which is expected to be filed in the near future.
But I didn’t mean to preempt audience participation. Please.
QUESTION [Anne Bergman-Tahon, Federation of European Publishers]: It’s our
Dutch members who introduced the case. I was at the hearing, and I concur with Ted.
For us, the main concern, apart from the legal aspects, is the only one who will be
able to make sure that a link has been deleted are those vendors who do it in a “walled
garden,” a sort of “un-zone,” and therefore the minute you will have finished reading a
book on Amazon, they will knock at your virtual door and say, “Would you like to resell
it?” again and again and again, and neither the authors nor the publishers will gain anything.
I think that this is going to disrupt, if the decision of the Court of Justice goes in
the way I’m afraid it may go, that would really reinforce the anticompetitive position of
some of the big players that have walled gardens.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: Don’t they already have a patent for forward-and-delete?
QUESTIONER [Ms. Bergman-Tahon]: Yes, they do. Amazon has a patent for
reselling secondhand e-books, whatever “secondhand e-books” may mean.
MR. FICSOR: Very quickly, I’d like to stress again something about what I
presented as a schema. Irrespective of whether there is complete deletion of a copy by a
forward-and-delete system or not, because a retention copy already exists, a so-called
online-exhaustion — which would be truly an exception to the rights of reproduction and
making available to public — still may not be applicable. As a result the speed, ease, and
the very low cost of online transmissions of, let’s say, e-books, thrillers, and also
audiovisual works, it really would get into competition with normal exploitation of the
works and, therefore, in conflict with the three-step test.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: You’re so right.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: I’m sure that we could spend the entire session on this, but we
really do have to turn to Jerker Rydén, who has a presentation with the intriguing title
“Copyright: Progression or Regression?”
MR. RYDÉN: Thank you, Michael.
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.
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Does the existing copyright regime provide the incentive for a diverse and
sustainable culture and strike an adequate balance between the exclusive right and
exceptions and limitations?
Copyright has excelled in producing a diverse and sustainable culture but the
information technology of the 21st century has created a challenge, how to facilitate the
communication of copyright protected works with the respect of the exclusive right and at
the same time striking a balance between the exclusive right and the interest of the society
on the whole of access to copyright protected works — i.e. how to maintain a sustainable
copyright regime.
The challenge I address in my speech is universal. Even so, WIPO has not
addressed it in a concrete way. In the European Union, it has been addressed although not
in whole and a proper analysis is lacking.
Article 17 of the DSM Directive13 provides the evidence of a dysfunctional
marketplace and a copyright regime, which is to some extent in free-fall. Neither the users
nor the creative industry or the creators themselves are content with the result.
In the same EU Directive another challenge is addressed, i.e. the aim to make it
possible for culture heritage institutions to make their collections available on the Internet.
Why do I mention this approach at all?
I perceive YouTube and cultural heritage institutions both to be aggregators. What
do I mean by an aggregator? Both YouTube and a cultural heritage institution make use of
copyright-protected works and make such works available to the public on the Internet.
Neither YouTube nor a cultural heritage institution owns the copyright to the works in
question.
Is there in essence a difference between YouTube as an aggregator and cultural
heritage institutions, which motivate the legislator to treat them differently? Both entities
make copyright-protected works available on a mass scale, they are both confronted with
the same challenge — works whose right holder cannot be identified, and thus the rights
cannot be cleared. Such a “filter effect” is addressed in Article 8–11 and could also be
solved using the licensing mechanism referred to in Article 12 – Extended Collective
Licensing and is already in practice in the European Union as far as mass communication
(SatCab Directive)14. So why cannot the licensing mechanism in Article 12 be considered
to solve the so-called filter effect the critics of Article 17 so often refer to?
Considering what I have said so far one could possibly take one of the following
positions:
(1) No change is needed.
.
(2) A tax/levy should be introduced to compensate right holders and WIPO should
be engaged and a convention introduced to strike a balance and introduce a global
limitation and right holders to be remunerated — a global level playing field to match a
global market.
(3) Article 17 of the DSM Directive is the solution and should be introduced in all
countries, or a global treaty or the alike.
(4) For those situations where direct licensing or traditional collective licensing is
not feasible, a contract, which is by law extended to non-represented right holders (compare
13

Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC.
14
Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and
cable retransmission.
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DSM Directive Article 12), would still fulfil the purpose of a contract — a flexible
instrument to set a price on a market — and at the same time solve the challenge addressing
how to clear rights of works whose right holder cannot be identified.
It is obvious the existing copyright regime is no good.
Exception/limitation in combination with a tax/levy can never be flexible enough
to enable the supply of copyright-protected works to meet the demand for such works on a
dynamic marketplace.
A contract, on the other hand, can do so and for those instances pure traditional
licensing (direct or collective) cannot be employed due to non-represented right holders, a
contractual solution can still be established, if, e.g., a collective licence is extended by law
to non-represented right holders.
Furthermore, a price is set on a market (the contract). A tax/levy on the other hand
is decided arbitrarily and is thus not representing the marketplace but a personal view on
the value of a copyright protected work.
It has been argued that ECL15 cannot be applied outside the Nordic countries. With
the DSM Directive Article 12 it is introduced on EU level.
It has also been said ECL cannot be applied outside of the Nordic countries due to
the ECL regime being a Nordic concept which requires the mind-set of a Nordic. This is
not true. The National Library of Sweden entered into a cross-border ECL agreement with
Malawi in 2018. This cross border ECL agreement is construed as a traditional collective
licensing based on reciprocal agreements and national ECL provisions extending the effect
of the collective license to non-represented right holders along the ideas elaborated on in
the Opinion presented on September 14, 2016 by ALAI.
I see four possible approaches to overcome the conundrum on a global level for
those situations where direct licensing or traditional collective licensing is not feasible; a
contract, which is by law extended to non-represented right holders (compare DSM
Directive Article 12):
(1) No copyright relevant action takes place outside the country of origin (compare
DSM Directive Art. 5 and 8)
(2) If objections were to be raised that copyright relevant actions are taking place
a compulsory exception for temporary copies such as Article 5.1 Infosoc Directive could
be introduced.
(3) A third solution could be as referred to in the ALAI Opinion and put into
practice in the Swedish cross-border pilots with Finland and Malawi, i.e. a traditional
collective licensing based on reciprocal agreements and national ECL provisions extending
the effect of the collective license to non-represented right holders.
(4) A fourth solution could be as referred to in the ALAI Opinion through a
bilateral or multilateral arrangement between states, or by a specific provision in an
international treaty.
Thus, several options are available and given the nature of different “aggregators”
different solutions may be considered.16
A question which I haven’t raised is the issue of business models and global
business models, which may have an enormous impact on cultures — that is, national
culture is not represented by those entities like in iTunes music, for example. That’s another

15

Extended Collective Licensing.
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question, and for that reason I mentioned culture heritage institutions. I’ll come back when
we have the panel discussion as to why that is so important.
Thank you so much.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Jerker. You’ve given us quite a few ideas to think
about. I’m sure your presentation will spark a spirited discussion.
Once again, we have five minutes allocated with speakers, panelists, and the
audience.
Let me look around on the panel at first to see if there are any initial reactions.
Ted?
MR. T. SHAPIRO: I’ve been won over by the Malawi argument, and I now believe
that extended collective licensing can cure cancer. [Laughter]
MR. RYDÉN: I didn’t mention it. I’m sorry.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: I’m sorry that it cannot be a panacea to dealing with issues
across the board. I can see ECL having a role in certain narrow areas, as it does now.
I disagree with the analysis. The Member States that pushed for what is now Article
12 felt that they needed it because of the Soulier and Doke17 decision; and I am concerned
that it will be used to introduce a lot of ECLs in countries where they have no tradition of
doing it; and I am concerned that opt-out, even in the Nordic region, doesn’t always work;
and that the notion that an ECL contract has any reflection on the marketplace is ridiculous;
and that when I license my content at arm’s length with the licensee, that is the market rate;
and if there’s an ECL price on the market, I’m not going to be able to do better anymore.
So the notion that copyright is in free-fall online — when you look at all the
amazing services available, the best way to deal with this issue, apart from enforcing
against rogues, is to get online licensing. And that’s what’s happening. Look at all the
services out there.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Ted.
I think Mihály has a comment, and Jerker is next.
MR. FICSOR: It is very important that ECL must only be applied where it is really
justified, where collective management is practically the only possible or only practical
way of exercising a right — of course, necessarily with a realistic, easy possibility of opting
out by those who still don’t want collective management. If it is really a necessary way of
exercising rights, there is no opting out.
Second, of course the organization should be appropriately established.
Third, as it is now stated also in Articles 8(1)(a) and 12(3)(a) of the new Directive
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, that organization should be duly representative.
This criterion is useful to avoid the misuse of extended collective management and is
applied appropriately.
In the countries where I work on behalf of WIPO and also the European Union
frequently, extended collective management is misused. In Russia, for example, before the
new Civil Code was adopted with all the IP rights being covered, it was possible that three
young people could come together, for example, in Novosibirsk and Ivan could say,
“Alyosha and Boris, if you are free in the afternoon, we should establish a collective
management organization with extended effect management. We will give a license to use
the entire world repertoire of audiovisual works, we will collect a lot; time and again we
may pay something to the rightsholders, but we will be rich.” It was settled — at least, at
the level of legal norms — in the Civil Code by reducing the applicability of extended
collective management to certain rights where it is indispensable and by prescribing certain
17

Case C-301/15, Marc Soulier and Sara Doke v. Premier ministre and Ministre de la
Culture et de la Communication, ECLI:EU:C:2016:878 (Nov. 16, 2016).
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criteria, for example, a realistic option for opting out from the system. In Ukraine, ECL
was also a solution. Just for music, musical performing rights, there were nineteen
organizations, and only some of them had repertoires. In agreement with the interested
international NGOs, including the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) which doesn’t very much like extended collective management, the solution was to
establish extended collective management, along with appropriate criteria, only in those
cases where it is truly necessary.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Jerker.
MR. RYDÉN: I said “free-fall” because we recognize that content (e.g. audiovisual) is illegally uploaded on YouTube. Is the right holder remunerated? No. That’s what
I mean by “free-fall.” The major problem is that content which is in demand is not made
available through legal means.
The problem is to identify every single right holder. Take music as an example. A
song could have six or more songwriters. In the United States such works are called
“stranded” works and the solution is a compulsory license because it is viewed that you
cannot make them available using traditional direct licensing.
So I think it is obvious there is a need for a solution, even for an entity such as
YouTube.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Jerker, for that.
Do we have a comment from the audience?
QUESTIONER [Fiona Phillips, Fiona Phillips Law, Sydney]: When you talk about
ECL, you talk about the Nordic countries, but New Zealand is actually an interesting
example where they have a limited form of extended collective licensing. As an Australian
lawyer, in my observation it actually can work better than our statutory licensing regime,
which is highly regulated, because it offers more flexibility.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: We have two more signals. On the other hand, we’re already
into the next session, so perhaps we can just take one of those.
The gentleman in the back because I don’t think he has spoken yet. Dueling is okay
to resolve this issue.
QUESTION [Lauri Rechardt, International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry, London]: Really just to set the record straight regarding music and direct
licensing, direct licensing in the recording industry definitely is the norm, and there are
now available 45 million tracks and counting. So anyone who claims that direct licensing
doesn’t work doesn’t really know what he is talking about.
The other point is I would be very, very concerned if ECL or statutory licensing
was used when licenses were not available because it could also be that the right owner
just does not want to license the product or service for good reasons. We are still speaking
about intellectual property here, and property rights are exclusive rights.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks so much.
We do need to turn to our next presentation, so from cultural institutions and
extended collective licensing we move to a topic of potential new subject matter for
copyright in Joel Smith’s presentation, “Can you Copyright a Smell or a Taste?” It takes
us into interesting issues of perception, an area that I’ve come to think of as “sensational
copyright.”
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Michael.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: That stinks.
MR. SMITH: My mission is to look, firstly, at the results of some conflicting
national decisions on copyright protection for scents, and the Court of Justice is looking at
protection for taste, another unconventional work, in Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods
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BV.18 I’m going to look at the application of general principles: what is a “work” under EU
law and what needs to be “an expression of authors’ own intellectual creation?” Should
copyright law seek to offer protection, or should we leave it to other forms of IP? And,
does the existing regime for copyright offer flexibility and should new types of work fit
the existing criteria? I may not get through all that, but we can have some more debate.
We’re going to start by looking at smell and taste. It’s worth remembering, of
course, that there are many other areas which you could cover potentially with
unconventional copyright. I’ve just listed a few here — i.e., tattoos, yoga, graffiti, DJ sets,
magic tricks, typefaces and jokes — some of which may fall into the bucket of
unconventional copyright; some may not. But, as humans continue to innovate, I think
potentially the types of “work” which may be copyrightable and protectable in that way
are likely to continue to expand, and we will see that.
Turning to issues with unconventional copyright, I want to mention upfront Article
2(1) of the Berne Convention: “Protection is for literary and artistic works including every
production in the literary, scientific, and artistic domain, whatever the mode or form of its
expression it might be.” Similarly, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article
9(2) of TRIPs: “Copyright protection may be granted to expressions but not to ideas,
procedures, methods of operation, or mathematical concepts.”
There are some issues to consider. Can an unconventional copyright work be
classified as a “work?” Does it fit into one of the usual categories of works? If we are
talking about smell or taste, can they be expressed in the way that can enable copyright
protection? Does the possible instability or subjective nature of them preclude copyright
protection? At the back of this really is the question: Is the hard work that might go into
the creation of an original smell or taste really that different from the creation of a literary
or artistic work?
Let’s look at Levola v. Smilde, a Court of Justice judgment of November 13, 2018.
This was a case in the Netherlands between two cheese manufacturers. Levola took the
view that the production of a competing cheese-flavored dip by Smilde infringed the
copyright in the taste of its own product, and it brought proceedings against Smilde before
the Dutch district court, seeking an injunction.
Smilde very strongly argued that the copyright in the taste referred to the overall
impression on the sense of taste caused by consumption, including the sensation in the
mouth and the sense of touch. Smilde took the rather traditional view that protection of
taste is not consistent with the copyright system, which is only intended to cover visual or
auditory creations, and also took issue with the instability of a food product and the
subjective nature of taste.
The Dutch Court referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice, including:
Is Article 2(1) of Berne relevant? Is it an indicative factor that the examples in Berne all
concern creations that can be perceived by sight and hearing? And there are a number of
questions around instability. The Dutch Court also asked the question whether the system
of exclusive rights and restrictions which are set out in Article 2(4) and 2(5) of the
Information Society Directive preclude the copyright protection of the taste of a food
product. It then went on to ask some other questions: If protection was possible, what
requirements are there for evidence; how should a court approach infringement?
In terms of the decision, Article 2(4) of the Directive states that Member States are
to provide a set of exclusive rights relating to works, and Article 2(5) sets out a series of
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exceptions and limitations. It follows that the taste of a work can only be protected if it can
be classified as a “work” within that Directive.
There are two cumulative conditions the Court set out, drawing together existing
jurisprudence: (1) the subject matter concerned must be original, in the sense that it is its
author’s own intellectual creation; and (2) only something that is an expression of that
author’s own intellectual creation may be classified as a “work.” Accordingly, the
Directive must be interpreted that the taste of a food product is precluded from being
protected by copyright under the Directive and, similarly, national legislation must be
interpreted that way.
In particular, the Court of Justice looked at “work” and what must be expressed,
and it said that it must be “identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity, even
though that expression is not necessarily in a permanent form.” You can see the rationale
for that, both in terms of ensuring that authorities, individuals, and businesses know the
subject matter of protection by third parties. But also you can see it from a legal certainty
perspective, to avoid subjective judgments.
In particular, on the taste of a food product, they very much emphasized that taste
is subjective and variable “since they depend on factors particular to the person tasting such
as age, food preferences and consumption habits, as well as on the environment or context
in which the product is consumed”; and also that “Science has not yet developed a technical
way to distinguish between tastes of the same kind of product.” Hence, the Court held that
the taste of a food product cannot be classified as a “work” and cannot be protected by
copyright.
I want to mention two other conflicting decisions in the scent field, which is one
of the reasons why the Court of Justice felt it needed to look at it in the taste context. The
Supreme Court of the Netherlands back in 2006 accepted in principle that there might be
copyright protection in the scent of a perfume.18 There was a very robust rejection of that
in 2013 by the Court of Cassation in France in a similar perfume case.19
I want to draw this together in some closing thoughts.
Why is this important? Well, obviously, there are a lot of high-value luxury goods
where taste, smell, and other factors may well be important factors and where people would
like to have protection under copyright.
We also have olfactory trademark protection, although, even with the trademark
reforms removing the graphic representation, the criteria still there in the Recital are quite
restrictive in that the representation must be “clear, precise, self-contained, easily
accessible, intelligible, durable, and objective.” Difficult criteria.
Science may change in the future as well. We may be able to actually distinguish
between scents and tastes using chromatology or smelling screens or other technical means.
At the back of this — and we may talk about this — is the legal test itself: Is the
EU definition of “work” too narrow? Some jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, have
an exhaustive list; is that compliant as well? Maybe the answer is that there is an openended list and, provided you fulfill these criteria, there could be new forms of copyright in
the future.
Thank you.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Joel. You’ve given us a lot to think about and a
lot to discuss.
Let me take a look around the panel initially. We have got once again five minutes.
Any signals? Mihály and Marcus, and then we’ll perhaps turn to the audience.
18
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MR. FICSOR: I would like to present a virtual PowerPoint presentation. You
should look at the first one: “Is it a joke?” There is another slide: “Of course, it may be
only a kind of joke.” Anybody at the level of, let’s say, usual newspaper and website
readers, must know the answer: “Of course, these are not works protected by copyright.”
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Marcus?
MR. VON WELSER: Just a short remark. In my opinion, even if the taste was
identifiable, questions concerning the scope of protection would remain. What should the
scope of protection of a taste be? Should alterations also be covered? Is it really worth
protecting the taste for seventy years after the death of the taste’s author or composer? It
would raise a lot of questions which are difficult to solve.
I think the correct answer of the CJEU should have been, “We are not competent
to decide this issue because there is no entire harmonization of the required level of
creativity yet. Until now only the required level of originality for photos, computer
programs and databases has been harmonized.” For those types of works intellectual
creation is necessary.
On the other hand, for example, there is no harmonization for design. The Design
Directive explicitly said that it is up to the Member States to define the precondition of
“works of applied art.”
Therefore, I think the case in some way also represents a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, not only between the EU judicial body and legislative body, but
also between the Member States and the European Union. If Member States have decided
not to regulate or harmonize a certain legal question, then it is not up to the CJEU to go
forward with defining what a “work” is.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: It has never stopped them before.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Marcus.
QUESTION [Massimo Sterpi, Gianni, Origoni, Grippo, Cappelli & Partners,
Rome]: Actually I’m working with an artist who creates perfumes as artworks. How can I
explain to her that, as she was working before with paintings and now she is working with
perfumes, the previous creativity was covered by copyright but the new one is not?
Honestly, it’s not easy.
As a practitioner, we get questions and requests for protection like this every day.
Clearly, there is a growing trend of trying to protect any kind of ideas that have some sort
of concrete output, and probably, as our society is going to be much more based on the
creativity of humans — because most of the things that can be done by machines will be
done by machines — I think that this trend will grow.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks for that.
I think we have some comments on this side of the room.
QUESTION [Jan Bernd Nordemann, Boehmert & Boehmert, Berlin]: Just one
remark on the Levola v. Smilde decision. I leave aside the really interesting question of
whether you can protect a smell. I think that’s not the major part of the decision, and
Marcus has pointed that out very well, and Joel as well.
I think the decision is a landmark decision because it establishes the European
principle of originality. Previously, we only had a line of cases that was not very explicit
about it, but this new case clearly sets a European standard for what you can protect as
copyrighted subject matter. It defines the standard as “mere originality,” so I think after
this decision the Member States’ courts are no longer allowed to apply a different standard
of originality.
The reason for this — Marcus has already referred to this — is that the term “work”
is used in the directives, and so the CJEU said, “Well, we have to know what a ‘work’ is,
and it’s a European term, and that’s why there needs to be a European interpretation of it.”
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I think that’s the importance of the case and not the protection of smell, yes or no, which
is interesting.
I want to hear maybe your thoughts. Am I completely mistaken about this or do
you share this view?
MR. SMITH: I do share that view that they have come up with an autonomous
concept that now will apply across the European Union. Speaking from the U.K.
perspective, I am very interested in that. Whether we are in or outside the European Union,
we will hopefully have that clarity. From that perspective, it is quite surprising that such
an important concept comes from what is a very thin and short judgment, and hopefully it
will be expanded.
MR. FICSOR: Only a modicum of creativity, intellectual creation, is sufficient in
the European Union. It has been clarified, first in the Software Directive and the Database
Directive, and concerning photographic works, in the Terms Directive, and then, in a
general manner, in the Infopaq judgment of the Court of Justice.20 It is good that in the
judgment you have mentioned on scents and as Jan Bernd also mentioned, the other basic
criterion is confirmed, although it was already very clear now under the international and
European law; namely, that the productions should be made in the literary and artistic
domains.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: I think we have time for one quick question or comment, and
then we probably need to move on.
QUESTION [Emilie Anthonis, Motion Picture Association]: I don’t know the
details of this case, but I was just wondering if you could capture a scent or a smell in a
written recipe, could you then argue that the smell itself or the scent is actually a derivation
of that work?
MR. SMITH: You could obviously have protection of the recipe as a written-down
literary work.
QUESTIONER [Ms. Anthonis]: Yes, that’s what I mean.
MR. SMITH: Then, the question is, would another scent be an infringement of that
description, which is a very difficult ask, I think.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: A fascinating area, and I’m sure we’ll be exploring this for
years to come.
Now, let’s move on to our final presenter, Judge Shibata, who is going to discuss
a recent linking case in Japan.
JUDGE SHIBATA: Today I would like to introduce the Japanese judgment by the
IP High Court last year that dealt with the issue of linking under the Japanese Copyright
Act.
First, I mention the relevant provisions of the Japanese Copyright Act. The
Japanese Copyright Act stipulates the right to transmit to the public. Article 23 says: “The
author of a work has the exclusive right to transmit to the public that work (this includes
the right to make the work available for transmission, if the work is to be transmitted to the
public via automatic transmission).”
“Automatic public transmission” means a transmission to a member of the public
that is made automatically in response to a request from the member of the public.
“Making available for transmission” (ix-5) means making it ready to be transmitted
via automatic public transmission, through either of the following actions: (a) recording
data onto a recording medium which (b) an automatic public transmission server uses for
transmission to the public.
20
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Last year’s judgment by the IP High Court of Japan in this case
(2016(Ne)10101/Apr./25/2018): “The photograph was used without the copyright holder’s
permission by A in his timeline of the tweet as a profile image. The data of the photograph
was uploaded and saved in the server, and that image appeared on A’s timeline.” The
photograph was used, uploaded, and saved in Server A and that photograph was used as a
profile image in the timeline of A’s tweet. In this case, both parties agreed that the act of
setting a profile image and the act of posting the tweet by A constitute infringement of the
right to transmit to the public.
Then, B re-tweeted A’s tweet, and the image of the photograph appeared on B’s
timeline. B re-tweeted his tweet, and the original photograph appeared on B’s timeline. I
took this photo. There the question is, did B infringe the right to transmit to the public by
re-tweeting?
According to the court, “The re-tweeting by B resulted in an online link to the URL
of the image information in the URL of B’s re-tweet timeline, and image file data would
be transmitted directly from the server of the target website to users’ personal computers,
and the image of the photograph will be displayed on users’ computers.” Therefore, the retweeting by B resulted in a direct link to the URL that made information in the URL of B’s
re-tweet timeline so the image file data would be transmitted directly from Server A to the
users’ personal computers and the image of the photograph would be displayed in the users’
computers.
Data of photographs displayed on the users’ personal computers by the re-tweeting
was transmitted and displayed at the request of the users. The Court stated it constituted an
automatic public transmission. The photograph data is present only in the target server,
Server A, and the image data was only transmitted from the URL of the information of the
image data. The court held: “An automatic public transmission of the photograph data
should be considered to have been done by the one who opened the URL with the
information of the image — that is A — not by the one re-tweeted it.”
The court continues: “The re-tweeting results in the photograph image being
displayed on the personal computers; however, pursuant to the interpretation of the
Japanese Copyright Act, such an increase does not provide grounds for perceiving B as
primary actor of the public transmission.”
The court continues: “It is hard to say that the re-tweeting made the abovementioned act of automatic public transmission easier, so B cannot be considered to be an
aider. In this case users can see the image of a photograph on B’s timeline, but that image
appeared on the users’ computers by so-called ‘indirect means,’ and the data was a
photograph while only on Server A and the data was directly transmitted from Server A.”
In this judgment the right to transmit to the public is considered from the technical
viewpoint. The judgment focused on the technical flow of the data, and in this judgment’s
view the person who sets the link may not be the primary actor of a transmission to the
public in principle. This view limits the liability of the one who sets a link in one sense:
this interpretation secures the freedom of the link in this Internet world.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan. It is not clear whether the
Supreme Court will deliver judgment on this issue. Many cases are dismissed for rather
simple reasons. If the Supreme Court picks up this issue, it may be an important case.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Yoshiaki. That was quite interesting, and I’m sure
there are observations perhaps from around the world, maybe perhaps beginning in the
European Union from a comparative perspective. Silke?
MS. VON LEWINSKI: Thank you, Michael. I will not comment on the Japanese
situation but on a framing case. Actually, I would like to share with you a brand-new piece
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of information. Yesterday, the German Federal Court submitted to the Court of Justice
another question related to framing, at least indirectly.
You may remember, at least those who are from Europe, that the Court had already
decided earlier on framing, and also on linking, stating that linking and framing are not acts
of communication to the public because there is a lack of a “new public,” because in those
cases the same technical means are used (i.e., the Internet). This means that there may be
a “new public” (and a communication to the public), according to the Court, if the right
owner expresses that he only wants to reach a restricted public, and he might do that by
applying technical protection measures.
Now the Federal Court — to go directly to the question — in a nutshell is asking
the Court of Justice whether the embedding of a work that had been freely made accessible
to the public on a website with the right owner’s consent on a third party’s website by
framing is an act of making available if the right owner has applied technical protection
measures against framing and someone would circumvent these technical protection
measures.
The Federal Court really wants to test, I think, this element of “new public” in
respect of the use of technical protection measures. It had already disagreed with the later
resolution of the Court of Justice on framing in the BestWater case,21 where the German
court had suggested to the Court that framing is different from linking and that it is an act
of making available.
The setting of the new case (which is a made-up case) is quite interesting because
it actually shows the negative consequences of the restrictive interpretation of the making
available right in the framing case by the Court of Justice: in fact, it may have as a
consequence that right owners have to restrict access by technical protection measures in
order to safeguard their rights on the Internet.
In the case at hand, the German Digital Library wanted to have a license to show
on its website thumbnails of paintings, which are stored on the websites of other libraries
to which it set up links. The competent collective management organization (CMO) for
artworks wanted to grant a license. You may know that under German law the CMOs,
which are de facto monopolies, are under an obligation in principle to grant licenses under
adequate terms and conditions. So they are not obliged to grant licenses at any price, any
condition, but under adequate conditions.
Now the CMO argued that, due to the framing case law of the Court of Justice, if
it just granted the license without any further condition, it would mean that its right owners
will lose their communication rights in the entire Internet for all framing purposes, and this
would not be appropriate. CMOs have an obligation to take care of the rights and to
safeguard the rights of their members as far as possible. So it wanted to oblige the Digital
Library in the proposed license agreement to apply technical protection measures so as to
safeguard rights against framing by third parties.
The Digital Library rejected that obligation and argued that this condition was not
fair, and the CMO would have to grant it a license anyway.
The referring court argued that such condition might be appropriate if at all the
Court of Justice would consider the framing through circumvention of technical protection
measures in the given situation as an infringement of the communication right.
This is the background of the case.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Silke. It can be truly said that we’re quite up to date
here at Fordham.
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MR. FICSOR: If I understand correctly, one of the questions is whether in order
to maintain the applicability of the rights you need technological protection measures or
some other machine-readable means.
I don’t like these elements of the provisions on text and digital mining which have
a little smell of formality. Nevertheless, there is a possible positive side of that too. It may
have an influence on the practice of the Court of Justice concerning the rights of
communication and interactive making available to the public.
I refer to the finding in the Svensson judgment22 according to which the right of
making available to the public may only be maintained — and not exhausted — if the
rightsholders restrict access to their works made available online. It seems that this only
meant restricting access by means of technological protection measures. This finding of
the Court had been based on the erroneous “new public” theory. Later, however, it seems
that, through the GSMedia23 and Soulier and Doke tandem of judgments, an alternative
legal basis has emerged; namely, the joint application of the implied license doctrine and
the innocent infringement defense.24 This was particularly clearly presented in paragraph
36 of the Soulier and Doke judgment. A new explanation — other than the unfortunate
“new public” theory — was offered for Svensson (not the explanation that, without
restricted access, the Internet population remains the same public and, thus, the right of
making available to the public is de facto exhausted): “The Court [in Svensson] held that,
in a situation in which an author had given prior, explicit and unreserved authorisation to
the publication of his articles on the website [of a newspaper publisher], without making
use of technological measures restricting access to those works from other websites, that
author could be regarded, in essence, as having authorised the communication of those
works to the general internet public.”
This is an implied licence language: if the author does not apply technological
measures, he or she could be regarded as having authorized the communication of those
works online. However, if this is the case, the justified question emerges — and this
undermines the legal construction in Svensson — what about a case where, in view of the
given circumstances, it is obvious — for example, due to a clear statement on the
rightholder’s website inevitably visible for any potential users — that no downloading of
works are allowed without authorization?
Is it possible to make this clear also without technological measures? Of course, it
is, and now the new Digital Single Market Directive states this in Recital (18) in an
unmistakable way (this is the positive side I have mentioned which might help the “new
public” theory fall into oblivion).
Article 4(3) of the Directive on an exception or limitation for data and text mining
reads as follows: “The exception or limitation provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply on
condition that the use of works and other subject matter referred to in that paragraph has
not been expressly reserved by their rightholders in an appropriate manner, such as
machine-readable means in the case of content made publicly available online.” The words
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“such as” indicate that using machine-readable means is not the only possible “appropriate
manner” to reserve rights.
In the Recital, it is admitted that “it can be appropriate to reserve the rights by other
means, such as contractual agreements or a unilateral declaration.” It would be a copyright
nightmare at the level of total absurdity to presume that any EU authority in any branch —
legislative, administrative or judicial — might try to declare that, although a right would
have to be reserved in an appropriate way (which, as a formality of protection, is in itself
problematic), not any appropriate way would be acceptable to make it clear, but only which
is in machine-readable format.
What about this? If this applies in the case of text and data mining exceptions or
limitations, it must apply also for other online uses, including those foreseen in Svensson.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: It’s quite possible, Mihály, that parts of the text and data
mining exception on steroids is influenced by Svensson and the case law that has developed
about it.
I’m trying to understand, to make a comparison between the situation with EU law
in this area, which of course has gone down the road, as Silke points out, of creating this
crazy “new public” element and then putting in these things about technical measures or a
legal source. We keep on having new questions come up because of it. We’ve gone down
this rabbit hole.
But to make the comparison to Japanese law, I was wondering, Your Honor, was
the content placed in the first instance with authorization or without?
JUDGE SHIBATA: Without.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: Without. So it was illegal content to begin with.
JUDGE SHIBATA: Yes.
MR. T. SHAPIRO: Thank you.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: We perhaps have time for one or two comments from the
audience. If not, I am sure you’re all looking forward to lunch, and we won’t hold you up
if there are no further comments.
We do have one comment.
QUESTIONER [Anne Bergman-Tahon, Federation of European Publishers]:
Thank you. Silke, is the reasoning of the library that it would be too expensive to have to
do the framing, or is it just because they want the pictures then to be reusable on the Internet
afterward?
MS. VON LEWINSKI: The main argument is indeed that it is very costly to
employ these technological protection measures, all the more, as it was said, since it seems
that the library for some reason would have to apply them to all works they have in the
collection, although it would only show on the Internet a smaller part of them. So, yes, this
case really shows the negative consequences of the Court of Justice’s judgments.
MR. M. SHAPIRO: Thanks for the question, and thanks for the response. We are
out of time.
I just want to take a moment to thank the presenters and the panelists and the
audience. I think we had a terrific session.
I will leave unresolved the question of whether the title should remain
“International Copyright” or “International Copyright Potpourri.” You’ll need to come to
Fordham 2020 for the answer!
Thank you all.
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